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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
Summer List 13, Sheet 2
No. 77-1724-CFX
BURKS, et al. (a mutual
fund, a majority of its
directors, and its investment adviser)

Cert. to CA 2 (Lumbard,
Oakes and Meskill)

v.
LASKER (mutual fund
stockholder)
SUr1MARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

Petrs challenge theCA's holding that the deter-

mination by a quorum of a mutual fund's board of directors, comprising a disinterested minority of all the directors, that assertion of a legal claim on behalf of the fund would not be in
the fund's best interest, cannot prevent stockholders from asserting that claim by way of a derivative action.

-

2 -

FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:

are~

incorporat~d

versified investment company,
£._

Petrs

an opened-ended di-

in Delaware and registered

7

under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (a nominal defendant) ,~
its investment advis e r,
.____~

an~

--

former and pr;z-sent directors of

-

--

the company who either were directors in late 1969 or are affiliated
with the investment advister.
the investment company.

Resps are two owners of shares in

In November and December of 1969, the in~

'1

vestment company purchased $20 million worth of Penn Central commerical paper from Goldman, Sachs & Co.

In January, 1970 Penn

Central filed for reorganization, and accordingly the commercial
no~

paper was

paid at maturity.

In settlement of an action by the

investment company against Goldman, Sachs, the paper was retu:r -ned

-

to Goldman, Sachs in return for $5.25 million and an assignment of
73.75% of whatever dividend is eventually paid on paper in thereorganization.
Resps brought this action as a derivative action
under the Investment Company Act, the Investment Advisers Act, and
state contract and corporation law, for damages to the investment
the/
company resulting from the sale and retention o~aper. The investresolved/
ent company's boardfihat five directors (a minority of the whole

boar~ who

wert1{ot affiliated with the investment

advise~ad

not

een directors at the time of the events giving rise to the claim

an~ere

not defendants in this action should act as a quorum of the

---------------~---

b~ard

---

suit.

to determine what position the fund should take regarding the
The

five ~~--------'---~--~----------~~..._.--------------~independent director i' retained ~tanley
Fuld, form'---"'-

.......

-

erly Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals and not related
~

to any party to this action, as special counsel.
~

After a lengthy

investigation, Judge Fuld submitted a report stating, inter alia,

-

3 -

~·

r~,

v:·

-~~

that, despite some uncertainties, it \<las likel:t that defendant ~

(

~

would prevail in this case.
After a number of meetings, lengthy questioning of

Jbu~J~
u ~~:~·;J
~~ ~ ~~)

and request for and submission of a supplemental report

- ---

Fuld,

--

the five directors determined that prosecution of the

would not be in the

~est

a~on

interest of the company, and that the cor-

-

proation would not prosecute the claims.

Petr thereupon moved to

dismiss the complaint.

-------

Di~trict

Judge Werker initially held that the determinationi}~

by a disinterested quorum of the board of directors not
cute the action required dismissal of the complaint.

to ~

He denied the

motion without prejudice, however, to afford resps an opportunity
for discovery aimed at uncovering evidence that the five directors
were not, in fact, disinterested.
renewed.
pugning

After discovery, the motion was

Judge Werker found that resps offered no evidence imt~A

------

directors' disinterestedness, and granted the

mot~~

Judge Lumbard stated that the

appea~ 7)

"raise[d] an important question of first impression:

Can ~

vThe CA reversed.

directors of a registered mutual fund, who were nominated by the
majority directors of the fund to be "independent" directors pursuant to the requirementsof the Investment Company Act .

. ter-

minate a non-frivolous stockholder's derivative action against th e
fund's majority directors and its investment adviser?"

The CA held

not, even though the court had "no doubt that the five minority
directors acted in good faith in all they did."
The CA expressly rejected as immaterial cases dealing with
the power of directors of other sorts of corporations to terminate

- 4 -

(

derivative

suits, or with the effect of the Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1

demand requirement.

Instead, it based its decision "on the unique

nature of the investment company and its symbiotic relationship
with its investment adviser."

In particular, Judge Lumbard noted

that the enactment of the Investment Company Act was motivated in
part by the belief that investment companies tended to be dominated
by their investment advisers.

He emphasized the addition of§ 36(b)

of the Act, in 1970, which authorizes shareholders to sue derivatively to recover excessive fees paid by the investment company
to the adviser and the principal underwrite4 and found it anomolous that mutual fund directors should be able to terminate
other actions.
On the basis of observations concerning, e.g., the day-today working relationship between interested and disinterested
directors, he concluded, "It is asking too much of human nature
to expect that the disinterested directors will view with the
~~-----------~~----~-----~-----~---------------------necessary objectivity the actions of their colleagues in a sit-

n
tJ-(

~

uation where an adverse decision would be likely to result in

lo

~

considerable expense and liability for the individuals concerne ."
CONTENTIONS:

Petrs assert that the traditional rule for

companies in general has been that, absent fraud, corruption or
the like, the directors' determination in the exercise of their
business judgment not to prosecute a claim bars a derivative
action. They note that with respect to this and most other cases ,

They contend that the CA erred in creating a novel, federal rule
regarding investment companies,

because in general the powers

-

5 -

nd duties of coporation directors are to be determined by the
law of the state of incorporation,

citing,~.,

Santa Fe In-

dustries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
Petrs also assert that theCA's decision conflicts with

""'-&.----....

In re Kaufman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).

That case held that the de-

mand requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 was not excused, in a
derivative action on behalf of a mutual fund, by the fact that
some of the directors were interested.

Language in that opinion

stated that mutual funds were to be treated no differently than

~~----------~----------~---------~---------

other corporations under Rule 23.1.

Finally, they contend

that the narrow application of the new§ 36(a), together with
the legislative history of that provision, shows that Congress
did not intend to abrogate the usual power of directors to terminate

derivative actions in most cases involving

mutual funds.
The Investment Company Institute and Investors Diversified
Services, Inc. have filed briefs as amici curiae
the petition for certiorari.

in support of

Both stress the disruptive potential

of the CA's decision on the inve stment company industry, by way of
increased number

of derivative actions.

The Institute also

makes the argument that the CA decision conflicts with the policy
of the Investment Company Act, of ensuring the existence of,
and giving special powers to, the independent directors for the
purpose of protecting the shareholders.

It furth e r contends that

disinterested directors, elected by the stockholders, are far
more likely to act in the interest of stockholders as a whole

an

-

6 -

than individual stockholder plaintiffs.
Resp replies that no corporate dire t rs may ever terminate
derivative actions after they proceed beyond the threshold issue
of demand.

They further asserts that neither Delaware law no r

the decisions of this Court relied on by petrs authorize a minto block a derivative acti 'l n against a majority of th e
ority of the board/ Resps distinguish this Court's decisions,
boa r
cited by petrs, concerning preservation of the states' authority
regarding corporate governance on thP. ground that they concerned
the existence of private rights of ac tign under federal statutes.
Finally, resp denies that the CA's decision conflicts with the
CA 1 decision in Kaufman Mutual Fund on the ground that in that
case a majority of directors
DISCUSSION:
search,

were disinterested.

It is my impression, based on very brief re-

that ~trs

are correct about the authority of directors

---~----------

to terminate derivative actions under Delaware law.
seems little

Certainly there

basis for resps' distinction between a minority

and a majority of distinterested directors:

so long as the de-

cision is made by a distinterested quorum, every vote which counts
toward determining the company's action is disinterested.
The actual rule of Delaware law, however, is beside the
point.

The issue proposed for review is whether the CA acted

properly in ignoring Delaware law altogether, and formulating
a ------------~~~---~--~-------------------------federal rule concerning the powers ofinvestment company directors.

Santa Fe Industries v. Green, in which this Court held

that SEC Rule lOb-5 does not afford a basis for a federal common law concerning the substantive responsibilities of directors in H

l

management

of companies, is contrary in spirit to theCA's

-

7 -

decimon to adopt a federal rule.
Even if a federal rule should be devised regarding mutual
fund directors, theCA's holding that such directors may never
terminate a derivative action is unfortunate.
decision as to

The holding shifts the

whether to prosecute a claim from directors to

individual stockholders.

Whereas the director is likely to be

sufficiently familiar with the company's affairs so as to be able
to decide wha t course is in the company's best interest, the stockholder is not.

Whereas the director is under a legal duty to act

in the best interests of the company as a whole (without regard
for the questionable impact of the fact that he is elected) , the
stockholder is not.

Finally, the stockholder's decision is likely

to be made by a lawyer.
(
'

Lawyers are not disinterested with re-

spect to whether to prosecute a claim or not:

they are economically

motivated to litigate.
The briefs of two amici in support of the petition indicate
the importance which the mutual fund industry attaches to this
) case.

Like anyone who manages other people's money, investment

advisers are susceptible of incurring liabilities which are huge
relative to their own assets.

An investment company cannot expect

aggressive management from its investment adviser unless it has
the power to forego asserting plausible claims against it.
I am personally familiar with the uproar this case has produced in the New York City bar.

With that caveat regarding my

own disinterestedness, I recommend certi~ari be granted.
There is a response.
8/10/78

ws

Lacy

Opn in petn
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LASKER

~~4-.L~~

14-4. ~t·1d ~.. .:1 d....._;_ - - ..,... - /
cert to CA 2 (Lumbar a, -oa~
and Meskill ~ -w..c!) ~ ~-7-

BURKS

v.

~ ;j /:#. •~

C'/12- dc~t. ~~~~~~s- -

~f~-!;;:~lf~;i}~ ~ime~
This

c~resents

the important problem of

the ~

authority~the ind~nt4li"fec~ rf9'tst~ ~

investment company, constituting a minority but a quorum of the
board of directors, to terminate a derivative action naming the
interested directors as defendants.
questions for review.

-~~ ..

The case presents two

,c. •

1.

Should the authority of the independent directors

be governed by state or federal law?

No provision of the

Investment Company Act or the Investment Advisers Act explicitly
governs the situation.

-

The DC did not even linger over the

question of the existence of the authority, and so never
in ~ ired abo~ th ~SQ$ o _l a_;;~ rity.

The CA 2 as_:umed ~ r ~

th~~ld t~~ply,
addressing the second question, infra.

u.s.

Green, 430
2.

and spent its

efforts ~

Santa Fe Industries v.

462 (1977), is implicated.

If federal law governs, did the CA 2 correctly

---

determine that the statutorily independent directors do not have
.....

....

--~-----...---------~----

the authority to terminate shareholder derivative suits against
the interested directors of the investment company?
Because of the way they approached the first issue,
neither the DC nor the CA 2 discussed or determined what
\

authority the relevant state law (Del. Corp. Law) gave to the
disinterested minority directors in this situation.

But if

state and federal law accord minority directors the same amount
of authority in this kind of situation, then I think the case
could be decided without reaching Question 1 supra.
I recommend discussing this case with a view to
granting the petition.

8/17/78
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BOBTAIL BENCH -MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
Burks v. Lasker, No. 77-1724
January 18, 1979
This case involves the power of independent directors of

a mutual fund to terminate a derivative suit brought against the
interested directors.

The Second Circuit held that unless a

district court determines that the derivative action is
frivolous, the independent directors are without power to prevent
prosecution of the suit.

The issue is presented especially

sharply, as the court below did not upset the trial court's
findings that the independent directors in this case were truly

';

2.
independent and acted in good faith.
The parties' briefs are not especially helpful, but
there some good amici briefs.

I thought the SEC's brief was

useful, perhaps because I agreed with many of its observations.
The SEC demonstrates convincingly that the ruling of the court
below is hard to maintain, as it holds the independent directors
hostage to the whims of a few disgruntled shareholders.
if the independent directors are denied

~

Further,

power to terminate a

derivative suit, their statutory function as watchdogs is
substantially undercut.

Respondents' arguments that (1) minority

quorums do not have the authority to terminate a derivative suit 1
and (2) Rule 23.1 supports the result of the Court below, are
frivolous, and unless they trouble you I will not deal with them
further.
The case appears to present two difficult issues:

(1)

whether the "fiduciary duty" which § 36(a) of the Investment
~--

Company Act imposes on the independent directors can be
interpreted to specify a substantive standard by which the
decision not to pursue a lawsuit can be evaluated:
so, what the content of that standard should be.

and (2) if
The most

directly applicable precedent, Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434

u.s.

934 (1978), adopted the

SEC's position that § 36(a) does require independent directors,
~

.

I)

in approving the operations of the investment adv1sor, to be free
of undue influence, to receive all the necessary information, and

~to

exercise reasonable business judgment.

If state law were to

apply, however, the obligation of the independent directors would

3.

be limited to not approving a transaction so manifestly injurious
to the corporation as to exceed the bounds of business judgment.
See Selheimer v. Manganese , Corp~, 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634
(1966);

Cary, Corporations 513-549.
The proposition that directors have an obligation to

exercise reasonable business judgment, apart from their
obligation not to act out of self-interst, does not seem
controversial.

As I learned corporation law, however, the former

duty carries with it a strong presumption of regularity on the
part of the directors;

courts have been exceedingly reluctant to

second-guess the disinterested business decisions of informed
directors.

See Briggs v. ST;>aulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891);

3A Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 1029 (1975
ed.)

Some decisions, although arrived at in good faith, may be

so manifestly wrong as to permit judicial intervention, but in
practice there have been few, if any, instances where courts have
acted to correct such errors of judgment.

The SEC's position, in

essence, is that the Investment Company Act requires mo!e _of the
independent directors.

As I understand the SEC's argument, the

fiduciary duty imposed by § 36(a) comprises a duty of care more
akin to modern concepts of tort law.

To achieve the special

purposes of the Investment Company Act, the independent directors
must not only exercise sound business judgment, but also reach a
decision that a hypothetical reasonable director acting in his
shoes would have approved.
In a formal sense, there is nothing too objectionable
about the SEC's position.

The federal courts have an obligation

4.

to interpret the meaning of "fiduciary duty" as it appears in §
36(a), and nothing on the face of the statute prohibits the
courts from reading into that term more than state law
traditionally has required.

The SEC argues that the structure

and policies of the Act support a stricter standard of care.
Strong arguments, however, can be made for the other
side.

"Fiduciary duty" is a term of art, and it is reasonable

for federal courts to refer to the common law in deciding what it
means.

Such has been the practice with respect to the Sherman

Act, among other statutes incorporating common law terms.
Furthermore, fairness to those persons who become directors of
these funds cuts against a retroactive expansion of their
liability.

Finally, the policy reasons that support the common

law rule apply here--

courts are not in the position to second-

guess the business decisions of directors acting in good faith.
It would be highly undesirable to require the parties to try the
merits of the underlying claim in order to determine whether the
directors can terminate the suit, a procedure the SEC position
entails.

See SEC Brief at 24 n. 20.

It should be enough that

the directors were fully and accurately informed on the state of
the law at the time they decided to terminate the litigation and,
in acting on that information, did not exceed the bounds of
business judgment.
The district court, as I read its opinion, applied the
appropriate state law standard to these facts.
tit. 8,

~

See Del. Code.

144(a)(1):
"(a)

No contract or transaction between a

5.

corporation and one or more of its directors or
officers, or betwen a corporation and any other
corporation, partnership, association, or other
organization in which one or more of its directors
or officers are directors or officers, shall be
void or voidable solely for this reason, or solely
because the director or officer is present at or
participates in the meeting of the board or
committee thereof which authorizes the contract or
transaction, or solely because his or their votes
are counted for such purpose, if:
"(1) The material · facts as to his relationship
or interest and as to the contract or transaction
are disclosed or are known to the board of
directors or
committee, and the board or
committee in · good · faith authorizes the contract or
transaction by the affirmative votes of a majority
of the disinterested directors, even though the
disinterested directors be less than a quorum."
(emphasis supplied).

me

I think the finding of good faith incorporates a determination of
reasonable care.

Thus this Court could reinstate the district

court's judgment of dismissal, rather than remanding the case to
the court of appeals.

This detail is not as important as how the

opinion is written.
One final point should be mentioned.

Petitioners have

conceded that a private cause of action exists under § 36(a) of
the Investment Company Act.

As far as I am aware, no decision of

this Court has so held, although the authority in the Second
Circuit decidedly is in favor of such an action.

It is not

necessary for purposes of this case to decide whether § 36(a)
supplies an action, but it is important for this Court to
recognize that the question remains open.

It would be

unfortunate for the Court to repeat its experience with Rule 10b5 and slip into the position of accepting an implied cause of
action without fully considering the problem.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 77-1724
Harry G. Burks, Jr., et al., )
.
.
.
Petitioners
On Wnt of Certwran to the
'
United States Court of ApvL. k
peals for the Second Circuit.
H owar d M . as er et a1.
,[April -, 1979]

MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether the disinterested directors of an investment company may terminate a
stockholders' derivative suit brought against other directors
under the Investment Company and Investment Advisers
Acts, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-1 et seq.; 15 U. S. C. § 80b-1 et seq.
To decide that question, we must determine the appropriate
roles of federal and state law in such a controversy.
Respondents, shareholders of Fundamental Investors, Inc.,
an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act, brought this derivative suit in February 1973 in
the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The
action was brought against several members of the company's
board of directors and its registered investment advisor, Anchor
Corporation. The complaint alleged that the defendants had
violated their duties under the Investment Company Act
(ICA)/ the Investment Advisers Act (IAA)/ and the common
law in connection with the 1969 purchase by the corporation
of $20 million in Penn Central Transportation Company
1 § 13 (a) (3), 15 U.S. C. § 80a-13 (a) (3), and former§ 36, 15 U. S. C.
§ 80a-35 (1964 cd.), 54 Stat. 841.
2 § 206, 15 U. S. C. § SOb-6.
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commercial paper. 3 In response to the suit, Fundamental's
board of directors determined that the five of its members who
were neither affiliated with the investment advisor 4 nor defendants in the action would decide what position the company
should take in the case. On the basis of outside counsel's
recommendation and their own investigation, the five , acting
as a quorum pursuant to the company's bylaws, concluded
that continuation of the litigation was contrary to the best
interests of the company and its shareholders and moved the
District Court to dismiss the action .
The District Court held that under the so-called "business
judgment rule," a quorum of truly disinterested and independent directors has authority to terminate a derivative suit
The complaint allegrd, inter alia,
"that Anchor brrachccl it~ ~tatutory, contractual and common law fiduciary clutie~ by relying exclusively upon the reprc~entations of Goldman,
Sacllti & Co. (a ~eller of commercial paper) , rather than independently
inve~tigating the quality and ~afety of the Penn Central 270-clay notes purchased by the Fund. It is further alleged that. the clefcnclaJJt directors
knew or should have known of Anchor '~ failure to meet it~ responsibility;
that they violated their ... duties by acquiescing in Anchor'~ omissions ;
that the financial condition of the Penn Central steadily worsened during
the period from November 28, 1969 to .Tune 21, 1970, the elate that it filed
for reorganization ; and that during this period of decline all of the defendants failed to invc~tigate and review the financial condition of the Penn
Central and the quality and safety of its commercial paper." La;;ker v.
Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 847 (SDNY 1977) .
4 The five were " di~intere~tecl" within the meaning of the Investment
Company Act, sre Lasker v. Burks, 567 F . 2d 1208, 1209 (CA2 1978) ,
which provides that
"No registered investment company shall have a board of directors more
than 60 per centum of the membrrs of which arc persons who arc interested persons of ~uch registered company." 15 U. S. C. § 80a-10 (a).
The definition of "interested per~on " i~ found at 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2
(a) (19). SrP n. 12, ·infra.
Of the remaining six directors, five were defendants in the Lw;ker suit,
and one wa» a director of the investment aclvi~er . Lasker v. Burks, 404 F,
Supp. 1172, 1175 (SDNY 1975),
3
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which they in good faith conclude is contrary to the company's best interests. 404 F. Supp. 1172 (SDNY 1975).
After permitting discovery on the question of the directors'
independence, the District Court entered summa.ry judgment
against respondents, finding no evidence that the directors
who voted to terminate the suit had acted other than independently and in good faith. 426 F. Supp. 844 (SDNY
1977). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
567 F. 2d 1208, 1212 (CA2 1978), holding that as a consequence of the Investment Company Act, "disinterested directors of an investment company do not have the power to foreclose the continuation of nonfrivolous litigation brought by
shareholders against majority directors for breach of their
fiduciary duties." We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1978).
We reverse.
I
The first step in determining whether state or federal law
governs this case is to ascertain what law creates the cause of
action alleged by the plaintiffs. Neither the Investment
Company Act nor the Investment Advisers Act-the plaintiffs' two federal claims-expressly creates a private cause
of action for violation of the sections relevant here. However. on the basis of District and Circuit precedent, the
courts below assumed that an implied private right of action
existed under each Act. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207,
222-228 (SDNY), aft"'d. 294 F. 2d 415 (CA2 1961) (en bane) ·
(ICA); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F. 2d 862 (CA2 1977)
(IAA); Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,
381 F. Supp. 260 (SDNY 1974) (IAA). The two courts also
sanctioned the bringing of the suit in derivative form, apparently assuming that, as we held in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U. S. 426, 432 (1964). "[t]o hold that derivative actions are
not within the sweep of the [right] would ... be tantamount
to a denial of private relief.'' As petitioners never disputed
the existence of pri¥ate, derivative ca.uses of action under the
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Acts, and as in this Court all agree that the question has not
been put in issue, Brief for Petitioners 28; Brief for Respondents 15, we shall assume without deciding that respondents
have implied, derivative causes of action under the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts. 5
Since we proceed on the premise of the existence of a federal cause of action, it is clear that "our decision is not controlled by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64," and state
law does not operate of its own force. Sola Electric Co. v.
Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942). See Board of Commissioners v. United States, 308 U. S. 343, 349-350 ( 1939);
Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190, 200 (1940); C. Wright,
Federal Courts 284 (3d ed.); Mishkin, The Variousness of
11
Federal Law," 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797, 799-800 ( 1957); Hart,
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L.
Rev. 489, 529 (1954); 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 971
(2d ed.). Rather, " [w] hen a federal statute condemns an act
as unlawful, the extent and na.ture of the legal consequences
of the condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial
determination, are nevertheless federal questions, the answers
to which are to be derived from the statute and the federal
3 The question whether a causr of nction exists is not a question of
jurisdiction, and thrrrforc may br assumed without being decided. Cf.
Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 279 (1977);
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). Other Courts of Apprals have
agreed with the Second Circuit that the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Arts create private causes of action. As to the Investment
Company Act, see Moses v. B·urgin, 445 F. 2d 369, 373 (CAl 1971);
Esplin v. Ifirschi, 402 F. 2d 94, 103 (CAIO 1968). Sec also Her'Pich v.
Wallace, 430 F. 2d 792, 815 (CA5 1970); Taussig v. Wellingto-n Fund, Inc.,
313 F. 2d 472, 476 (CA3 1963). Compare Greater Iowa Corp. v.
McLendon, :378 F. 2d 783, 798 (CA8 1967), with Brouk v. Managed
Funds. Inc., 286 F. 2d 901 (CA8 1961), vacated as moot, 369 U. S. 424
( 1962) . As to the Inve,;tment Advi:-;er:< Act., f'ee Leu·is v. 'l'mnsamerica
Corp .. 575 F. 2d 2:37 (CA9 1978) , ccrt. gruntrd, No . 77-1645,- U.S.(1978); Wilson v. First Houston Investment C'orp., 566 F . 2d 1235 (CA5.
1978), cert. granted, No. 7 7 - , - U. S. (1978) .

..
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jY01icy which it has adopted." Sola Electric Co. v. Jeffersoq~
Co., 317 U.S., at 176. See Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210, 213 (1944);
Board of Commissioners v. United States, supra. Cf. United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., No. 77-1359, at 9-10, U.S.
- , (1979); Butner v. United States, - - U. S. (1979). Legal rules which impact significantly upon the effectuation of federal rights must. therefore, be treated as raising
federal questions. See Robertson v. Wegmamn, 436 U. S. 584,
588 (1978) (statute of limitations); Auto Workers v. Hoosier
Corp. , 383 U. S. 696, 701 (1966) (same); J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U. S., at 435 (security for expense statute); Sola
Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U. S., at 176 (rules of
estoppel); Dietrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S., at 200 (affirmative
defense to federal claim). See generally Friendly, In Praise
of Erie- and of the New Federa.l Common Law, 39 N.Y. U. L.
Rev. 383, 408 (1964); Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal
Nondiversity Litigation , 69 Harv. L. Rev. 66, 92-93 (1955).
Thus, "the overriding federal law applicable here would,
where the facts required, control the appropriateness of redress
despite the provisions of state corporation la.w .. .." J. I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S., at 434 (emphasis added).

II
The fact that "the scope of [respondents' ] federal right is,
of course, a federal question" does not, however, make state
law irrelevant. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U. S. 570, 580
(1956). Cf. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. , No. 771359, at 11, - U.S.-, - . It is true that in certain areas
we have held that federal statutes authorize the federal courts
to fashion a complete body of federal law. See T extile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 , 456-457 (1957). Corporation law, however, is not such an area.
A derivative suit is brought by shareholders to enforce a
claim ou behalf of the corporation. See Note, The Demand
and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions,
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44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 168 (1976). This case involves the question whether directors are authorized to determine that certain
claims not be pursued on the corporation's behalf. As we have
said in the past, the first place one must ~ook to determine
the powers of corporate directors is in the relevant State's
corporation law. See Santa Fe Industries v. Gree-n, 430 U. S.
462, 479 (1977); Cart v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,84 (1975). "Corporations are creatures of state law," Cart v. Ash, supm, and
it is state law which is the font of corporate directors' powers.
By contrast, federal law in this area is largely regulatory and
prohibitory in nature-it often limits the exercise of directorial power, but only rarely creates it. Cf. Price v. Gurney,
324 U. S. 100, 107 ( 1945). In short, congressional legislation
in this area is generally enacted against the background of
existing state law; Congress has never indicated that the
entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply
because a plaintiff's cause of action is based upon federal law.
Cart v. Ash, supra; Santa Fe Industries v. Green, supm. See
United Copper Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261,
264 (1917). Cf. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352353 (1966) (state family law); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351
U. S., at 580 (same); P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro and
H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and The Federal System
470-471 (1973 ed.).
Federal regulation of investment companies and advisers
is not fundamentally different in this respect. Mutual funds,
like other corporations, are incorporated pursuant to state, not
federal law. Although the Court of Appeals found it significant that "nothing in ... the legislation regulating investment
companies and their advisers ... suggests that ... disinterested
directors ... have the power to termina.te litigation brought
by mutual fund stockholders ... ," 567 F. 2d, at 1210, such
silence was to be expected. The Investment Company Act
does not purport to be the source of authority for managerial
power; rather, the Act functions primarily to "impose[]
controls and restrictions on the internal management of invest.,
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ment companies." United States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694,705 n. 13 (1975) (emphasis added).
The Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts,
therefore, do not require that federal law displace state laws
governing the powers of directors unless the state laws permit
action prohibited by the Acts, or unless "their application
would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the
cause of action." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421
U. S. 454, 465 (1975).° Cf. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436
U. S., at 590; Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U. S., at
706-707; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S., at 176.
Although "[a] state statute cannot be considered 'inconsistent' with federal law merely because the statute causes the
plaintiff to lose the litigation," Robertson v. Wegm(lfnn, supra,
at 593, federal courts must be ever vigilant to insure that
application of state law poses "no significant threat to any
identifiable federal policy or interest . . . . " Wallis v. Pan
American Petroleum Corp., 384 U. S. 63, 68 (1966). See
Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U. S.. at 702. Cf.
Brown v. Western R. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 298 (1949).
And, of course, this means that "unreasouable," Wallis v.
Pan American Petroleum Corp., supra, at 70, or "specific
6 Thi
is not a situation where federal policy requires uniformity, and
therefore where the ver~· application of varying state laws would itself be
inconsis1 cnt with frderal interests. In rnActing the Invr~tmrnt Company
and Invrstmrnt Adviser;;; Acts, Congress did declare that "the activities
of such compailies, extending over many States ... make difficult, if not
impos;o;ible, effective State rrgulation of such compAnic,; . . . ." 15
U. S. C. § SOa-1 (a) (5). But. as long AS private causes of action are
available in fedeml courts for violation of the federal statutes, thiR enforcement problem is obviated. The real concern, therefore, i~ not that state
laws be uniform, but rather that the laws applied in suits brought to
enforce frderal rights meet the standard,: necrs.-sary to insure that, the
"prohibition of [t.he] frderal statute ... not br set at naught," Sola
Electric C'o. v. Jpfferson ('o., 317 U.S. Jn, 176 (1942). The "con::;i~tency"
requirement described in text guarantees that state laws failing to meet
these standards will be precluded,
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abberant or hostile state rules," United States v. Little
Lalce Misere Land Co., 412 U. S. 580, 596 (1973), will not
be applied. See, e. g., Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F. 2d 815,
819-820 (CAl 1964). The "consistency" test guarantees that
"[n] othing that the state can do will be allowed to destroy
the federal right," Board of Commissioners v. United States,
308 U. S., at 350, and yet relieves federal courts of the necessity to fashion an entire body of federal corporate law out of
whole cloth.

III
The foregoing indicates that the threshold inquiry for a
federal court in this case should have been to determine
whether state law permitted Fundamental's disinterested directors to terminate respondents' suit. If so, the next inquiry
should have been whether such a state rule was consistent
with the policy of the Investment Company and Advisers Acts.
Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals decided
the first question. apparently because neither considered
state law particularly significant in determining the authority
of the independent directors to terminate the action. 7 And
in that circumstance, neither court addressed the question of
inconsistency between state and federal law. At least implicitly, however, the Court of Appeals did make a related
determination. Its holding that nonfrivolous derivative suits
may never be terminated makes manifest its view that no
other rule-whether state or federal-would be consistent
with the Investment Company Act. 8 We disagree.
The Court of Appeals correctly noted, 567 F. 2d, a.t 12101211, that Congress was concerned about the potential for
abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies. A
mutual fund is a pool of assets, consisting primarily of portS<'e 567 F. 2d 1208; 404 F . Supp. 1172.
The Court of Appeals did not undertake any separate analysis of the
policy behind the Investment Company Act'::; companion statute, the In-·
vestment Advisers Act,
7

8
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folio securities, and belonging to the individual investors
holding shares in the fund. Tan'nenbaurn v. Zeller, 552 F . 2d
402, 405 (CA2 1977). However, as Congress recognized,
"Mutual funds, with rare exception, are not operated
by their own employees. Most funds are formed, sold,
and managed by external organizations, that are separately owned and operated [investment advisers] . ...
The advisers select the funds' investments and operate
their businesses. . . . Since a typical fund is organized
by its investment adviser which provides it with almost
all management services, ... a mutual fund cannot, as a
practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser.
Therefore, the forces of arm's-length bargaining do not
wQrk in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as
they do in other sectors of the American economy." S.
Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1969).
As a consequence, "[t]he relationship between investment
advisers and mutual funds is fraught with potential conflicts
of interest," Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F. 2d 807, 808
(CA2 1976). See generally S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., 5 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 9,
45-46, 64 (1966); H. R. Doc. No. 136, 77th Cong. , 1st Sess.,
2485- 2490, 2569, 2579-2580, 2775 (1942); Hearings on H. R.
10065 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 58-59
(1940); SEC, Report on the Study of Investment Trusts and
Investment Companies, pt. 3, 1-49 (1940); 15 U. S. C.
§ 80a-1 (b) (findings and declaration of policy) .ll Yet, while
these potential conflicts may justify some restraints upon the
unfettered discretion of even disinterested mutual fund direc9 See also Tannenbaum v. Zeller. 552 F . 2d 402, 405 (CA2 1977) ;
Radmer, Duties of the Directors of Invr:;tmrnt Companir:;, 3 Journ . Corp.
L. 61, 63 (1977) ; Note, 47 Ford. L. Rev. 568 (1979) .
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tors, particularly in their transactions with the investment
adviser, 10 they hardly justify a flat rule that directors may
never terminate nonfrivolous derivative actions involving codirectors. In fact, the evidence is overwhelming that Congress did not intend to require any such absolute rule.
The cornerstone of the Investment Company Act's effort to
control conflicts of interest within mutual funds is the requirement that at least 40% of a fund's board be composed of
independent outside directors. 11 15 U. S. C. § 80a-10 ,(a). As
originally enacted, § 10 of the Act required that these 40% not
be officers or employees of the company or "affiliated persons"
of its adviser. 54 Stat. 806. In 1970, Congress amended the
Act to strengthen further the independence of these directors,
adding the stricter requirement that the outside directors not
be "in teres ted persons." See § § 80a-10 (a), 80a-2 (a) ( 19) .12
10 See, e. g., § 36 of the Investment Company Act, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-35,
and § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-6, imposing
minimum <;tandards on the behavior of investment company directors and
advisrrs which presumably apply as much to their decisions rrgarding litigation as to thr other decisions they may be callrd upon to make. See
Santa Fe Ind·ustries. Inc. v. G-reen, 430 U. S. 462, 471 n. 11 (1977)
(" ... Congrrss intruded the Invcl:ltmrnt Advisrrs Act to establish federal
fiduciar~· standards for investment. advi:ocr::;."); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau. 375 U. S. 180, 191-192 (1963); Cramer v. Ge-neral 'l'el.
(~ Electronics Corp., 582 F. 2d 259, 275 (CA3 1978); 'Tannenbaum v.
Zeller, 552 F. 2d, at 418-419.
11 Under certain eirrmnstaners, independrnt dirrctors must constitute a
majority rathrr than 40% of the board. Ser § 80a-10 (b).
12 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a) (19) defines an "'interested per<;on' of another
person ... when used with respect to an investment company," as
"(i) any affiliatrd person of such company,
"(ii) any mrmber of the immediatre family of any natural per;:;on who is
an affiliatrd prrson of such company,
"(iii) any interested person of any investment adviser of or principal
underwriter for such company,
" (iv) any person or partner or employee of any person who at any time
since the beginning of the last two fiscal years of such company has acted
as ](>gal counsel for such company,
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To these statutorily disinterested directors, the Act assigns a
host of special responsibilities involving supervision of management and financial auditing. They have the duty to
review and approve the contracts of the investment adviser
and the principal underwriter, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-15 (c); the
responsibility to appoint ether disinterested directors to fill
vacancies resulting from the assignment of the advisory contracts, 15 U. S.C. § 80a-16 (b); and are required to select the
accountants who prepare the company's Securities and Exchange Commission financial filings, 15 U.S. C. § 80a-31 (a).
Attention must be paid as well to what Congress did not
do. Congress consciously chose to address the conflict of
interest problem through the Act's independent directors section, rather than through more drastic remedies such as com" ( v) any broker or dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 or any affiliated person of such broker or dealer, and
"(vi) any natural person whom the Commission by order shall have
determined to be an interested person by reason of having had, at any
time sincr the beginning of the last two fiscal years of such company, a
mnterial business or professional relationship with such company or with
the principal executive officer of such company or with any other investment company having the Bame investment adviser or principal underwriter or with the principal executive officer of such other investment
company."
15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a) (2) states that "'affiliated company' means a compnny which is an affiliated person," and 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a) (3)
defines "'affiliated per:;on' of another person" as
"(A) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with
power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities
of such other person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose
outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled,
or held with power to vote, by such other person; (C) any person directly
or indirectl~r controlling, controllrd by, or under common control with, such
other person; (D) any officer, director, partner, copartner, or <>mployee of
such other person; (E) if such other person is an investment company,
any investment adviser thereof or nny member of an advisory board
thereof; and (F) if such other person is an unincorporated investment
company not having a board of directors, the depositor therrof."

...
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plete disaffiliation of the companies from their advisers or ·
compulsory internalization of the management function. See
Report of the SEC on the Public Policy Implications of
Investment Company Growth, H. R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., 147-148 (1966). Congress also decided not
to incorporate into the 1940 Act a provision, proposed by the
SEC, that would have forced investment companies to seek
court approval before settling claims against "insiders" that
could be the target of derivative suit. See S. 3580, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. § 33 (a) (1940); Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F . 2d 994, 997
n. 4 (CA2 1965). And when Congress did intend to prevent
board action from cutting off derivative suits, it said so
expressly. Section 36 (b). 15 U. S. C. § 80a- 35 (b )(2) , added
to the Act in 1970, performs precisely this function for
derivative suits charging breach of fiduciary duty with respect
to advisor's fees."1 No similar provision exists for derivative
suits of the kind involved in this case.
Congress' purpose in structuring the Act as it did is clear.
It "was designed to place the unaffiliated directors in the role
of 'independent watchdogs,' " Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.
2d, at 406, who would "furnish an independent check upon
the management" of investment companies, Hearings on H. R.
10065 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 109
( 1940). This "watchdog" control was chosen in preference
to the more direct controls on behavior exemplified by the
options not adopted. Indeed, when by 1970 it appeared that
the "affiliated person" provision of the 1940 Act might not be
adequately restraining conflicts of interest, Congress turned
not to direct controls, but rather to stiffening the requirement
of independence as the way to "remedy the act's deficiencies."
13

See also § 16 (b) of the SccuritieH Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78p (b) , which authorizes shareholder suits to recover insider "short
swing" profits on behalf of the company notwithstanding the decision Q~
the board of directors not t o sue.
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S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 32-33 (1969):11 Without question, "[t]he function of these provisions with respect
to unaffiliated directors [was] to supply an independent check
on management and to provide a means for the representation
of shareholder interests in investment company affairs." Ibid.
In short, the structure and purpose of the Investment Company Act indicate that Congress entrusted to the independent
directors of investment companies, exercising the authority
granted to them by state law. the primary responsibility for
looking after the interests of the funds' shareholders.1 " There
may well be situations in which the independent directors
could reasonably believe that the best interests of the shareholders call for a decision not to sue-as, for example, where
the costs of litigation to the corporation outweigh any potential recovery. See Note, 47 Ford. L. Rev. 568, 580 ( 1979);
Note, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 168, 196. See, e. g., Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F. 2d, at 418; Cramer v. Ge·neral Tel. &
Electronics Corp., 582 F. 2d 259, 275 (CA3 1978). In such
cases, it would certainly be consistent with the Act to allow
the independent directors to terminate a suit, even though
Seen. 12, supra.
As an adjunct to its main argument which restrd upon the structure of
the Investment Company Act, the Comt of Appeals was abo of the view
that mutual fund directors can never be truly disinterested in suits involving their codirectors. 567 F. 2d, a,t 1212. WhilE> lack of impartiality
rrwy or may not. be t.rue as a, mattC'r of fact in individual casr~. it is
not a ronclusion of law rrquired by the InvestmE>nt Company Act. Congress surely would not have entrusted ::;uch critical functions as approval
of advisory contracts and selection of accountant~ to the statutorily disinterested directors had it shared the Court of Appeals' view that such
directors could never be "disinterested" where their codirectors or investment advisers were concerned. In fact, although it waR speaking only of
the statutory definition, Congress declared in the srcond section of the
Act, " [t]hat no per:;on shall be deemed to be an interested person of an
investment compan~' solrl~· by reason of his being a member of it ~ board
of directors or advisory boa,rd ... ." § 80a-2 (a.) ( 19) . Sef' also § 80a-2
(a) (9) ("A natural person shall be presumed not to be a controlled person
within the meaning of thi~ subchapter.")
14
15
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not frivolous. Indeed, it would have been paradoxical for
Congress to have been willing to rely largely upon "watchdogs" to protect shareholder interests and yet, where the
"watchdogs" have done precisely that, require that they be
totally muzzled. 16
IV
vVe hold today that federal courts should apply state law
governing the authority of independent directors to discontinue derivative suits to the extent such law is consistent with
the policies of the Investment Company and Investment
Advisers Acts. Moreover, we hold that Congress did not
require that States, or federal courts, ~~ forbid director termination of all nonfrivolous actions. However, since
"[w]e did not grant certiorari to decide [a question of state
law]," Butner v. United States, No. 77-1410, at 3 , - U. S.
( 1979) , and since neither the District Court nor the Court
of Appeals decided the point, 17 the case is reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with thiSopinion.
B~v. United States, supra; Wallis v. Pan American
Petroleum Corp., 384 U. S., at 72.
Reversed.
16

As an alternative ground in support of the judgment below, respondent::; urge that Fed. Rule Civ. Proc . 23.1 prohibits termination of this
derivative action. That rule stat,es that a. derivative action "shall not be
o"
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court .
However, as .Judge Friendly noted with re:.:prct to former Rule 23 (c),
those words apply only to voluntar~· srttlements brtween derivative
plaintiffs and ddendants, and werr intended to prE'vent plaintoiff~ from
selling out. their fellow :::hareholders. The~· do not appl~· where the
plaintiffs' action is involuntarily di::;mi ··eel by a court, as ocrurred in this
case. Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F. 2d 994, 996-997 (CA2 1965). ThE' same is
true of thr idrntieally worded Rule 23.1. See C. Wright and A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Proeeduro § 1839, at 427, 435, 436 (1972) ; 3B
.J. Moorr, Federal Practice ,[ 23.1.24
n.t 23.1-131 (1976).
17 In this Court, thr partirs hotly di::;putr thr contrnt of thr rorrrct
state rule. Company Brief for Petitioner;; afi-38, with Brief for Respondents 35-39,
0
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part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Sincerely,

," J~
Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 19, 1979

Re:

77-1724 - Burks v. Lasker

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

~u:prtm.t

(!JGu.rt Gf tlft 'Jllttittb ~tntts
1llaaJringtGn. ~. Qt. 20gtJ~.;t

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

April 24, 1979

Re:

No. 77-1724 - Burks

v.

Lasker

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T,M.

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEE
No. 77-1724
Harry G. Burks, Jr., et al.,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Petitioners,
United States Court of Apv.
peals for the Second Circuit.
Howard M. Lasker et al.
[May -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE STEWART, concurring in the judgment.
The Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers
Act are silent on the question whether the disinterested directors of an investment company may terminate a stockholders'
derivative suit. The inquiry thus must turn to the relevant
state law. I cannot agree with the implications in the
Court's opinion, ante, at 8. 9-10, 14. that there is any danger
that state law will conflict with federal policy.
The business decisions of a corporation are normally entrusted to its board of directors. A decision whether or not
a corporation will sue an alleged wrongdoer is no different
from any other corporate decision to be made iu the collective
discretion of the disinterested directors. E. g., Swanson v.
Traer, 354 U. S. 114, 116; United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S. 261. 263; McKe e v. Rodgers,
18 Del. Ch. 81, 156 A. 191 (Ch. 1931); Rice v. Wheeling
Dollar Savings & 'Prust Co. (Ohio App.), 130 N. E. 2d 442
(1954); Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d 748, 144 P. 2d
725 (1944).
On remand, the issue will be whether the state law here
applicable recognizes this generally accepted principle and
thereby empowers the directors to terminate this stockholder
suit. Since Congress intended disintereEted directors of mutual funds to be "independeut watchdogs," ante, at 12, I can
see no possible conflict between this generally accepted princjple of state law and the federal statutes in issue.

May 1, 1979

77-1724 Burks v . Lasker.

Dear Potter:
Please join me in your concurring opinion .
Sincerely ,

Mr .

Justic~

St~wart

lfp/ss
cc:

Th~

Conferenc~

j)upumt Qfcurl of t4t 1Jlnitt~ j;t
~as-fringhtn. ~. QJ. 20~'!~ .

9

CHAMBERS OF'

/

THE CHIEF JUSTICE '

May 8, 1979

Re:

77-1724 - Burks v. Lasker

Dear Bill:
I

join.
Regards,

I

:2._/'J

l)/ u~
Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

May 9, 1979

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

77-1724 - Burks v. Lasker

Dear Bill,
It took a little time, but please
add my name to your list in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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